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NOTES
Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act
Courts have frequently implied private causes of action under
criminal or regulatory statutes to effectuate more fully the purposes of
such statutes by encouraging citizen enforcement. 1 Recently, two
federal district courts,2 the first to have considered the issue carefully,3 reached conflicting conclusions whether to imply a private cause
1. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
( recognizing action under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)(right inferred from fourth amendment); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (cause of action under Railway Labor Act);
Texas & P. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 23 (1916) (implication under Federal Safety
Appliance Act). But see Cort v. Ash, 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 17, 1975) (no
implied action under 18 U.S.C. § 610); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (no implied action under §
307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1959) (no action pursuant to title II of the Interstate Commerce Act).
2. Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp, 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), (noted in 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (1974); 48 TEMPLE L. Q, 433
( 1975)); Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974).
3.. Although violations of the Investment Advisers Act have occasionally been
alleged in private actions, they have generally been asserted in conjunction with
claims of alleged violations of other securities statutes and thus have received little
judicial attention. See Kutner v. Gofen & Glossberg, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 93,109 (7th Cir. July 7, 1971); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund,
Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Brouk v.
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424
(1962); Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 95,285 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392
F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Competitive Capital Corp. v. Yamada, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,617 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974); Jones Memorial
Trust v. Tsai Investment Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Young v.
Seabord Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Skydell v. Mates, 59 F.R.D. 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Schlusselberg v. Werly, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 92,012
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1967); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
In Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 1974), the plaintiff sought recovery
exclusively under the Investment Advisers Act. The court's reasoning, however, was
not elaborate and thus can be summarized briefly.
The complaint in Gammage alleged violation of section 203(e)(5) of the Advisers
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-3 (Supp. Aug,
1975), which gives the Commission enforcement powers over any investment adviser
or "person associated with such investment adviser" who aids or abets the violation of
any of the securities acts. The court declined to recognize an implied private cause of
action for violation of this section. In reaching this decision, the court relied on
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of action for damages for violations of section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.4 That Act, administered by the SEC, was
enacted for the purpose of eliminating the "questionable business
methods" 5 then prevalent among the investment advisory industry. 6
precedent. First, the court pointed to two circuit court cases, Brouk v. Managed
Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962)
(noted in 13 STAN. L. REV. 964 (1961)), and Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434
F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 901 (1971), which it interpreted as
denying private actions under the Advisers Act. Although unspecified violations of
the Investment Advisers Act were alleged in Brouk, 286 F.2d at 902, the complaint
primarily asserted violations of various sections of the Investment Company Act, and
"[t]he court devoted its analysis ;to the Investment Company Act violations, apparently assuming that the Advisers Act provisions were inapplicable or too similar to
warrant detailed consideration." 13 STAN. L. REv. 964, at 964 n.2. Kauffman was a
class action brought by a shareholder of 4 mutual funds against 65 mutual funds and
the Investment Company Institute. The plaintiff alleged violations of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, the Investment Company Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 434 F.2d at 731-32. The court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiffs lack, of
standing to bring a direct class action against, or a derivative class action on behalf
of, those mutual funds in which he did not have any ownership interest. See text at
note 148 infra. Thus, neither Brouk nor Kauffman would seem to be the sort of
firm precedent on which a court, faced with the problem whether to imply private
causes of action, should rely.
Second, in dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the Gammage court relied on the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1966). However,
[t]he analogy drawn by the Gammage court between its facts and those of
Colonial is not convincing. In Colonial the court was concerned with whether
a private cause of action could be implied for violations of Exchange rules
promulgated under the mandate of§ 6 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.
The Colonial court relied on the fact that the statute itself depends on the exchange to sanction their own members for violations.
Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. ,r 95,285, at 98,464 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). A third court recently refused to imply a private
right for violations of section 203 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1970), as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3 (Supp. Aug. 1975). See Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25,
1974), discussed in note 3 supra.
5. Comment, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, l VAND. L. REV. 68, 69
(1947).
6. See note 73 infra and accompanying text. One commentator summarized some
of the questionable practices as follows:
In 1939, it was not uncommon for an adviser to arrange that one client buy a
certain security and that another sell the same one. Where the adviser operated
on the then commonly accepted basis of receiving a proportion of profits made
by his clients, he could not lose by using this technique. The adviser's sole concern was to seek new clients to replace those whose assets or credulity were
exhausted. Adviser custody of clients' funds was the basis of most deceptive
practices. Instead of buying and selling in the interest of the client there was
frequently a shifting of high quality securities to the adviser's personal account
and the placing of his unwanted issues in the client's account.
Comment, supra note 5, at 69-70 (footnote omitted). See also Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 214, 244-45 (1959).
In its 1966 report to Congress on the investment industry in general, the SEC
summarized the regulatory function of the Advisers Act as follows:
The Advisers Act, enacted as a companion to the [Investment Company] Act,
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Within the reach of the Advisers Act are persons who "engage in
the business" of investment advising or who, while principally engaged in some other business, receive "special compensation" for
investment advice. 7 Like other securities statutes, the Act requires
registration with the SEC, prohibits fraudulent practices, and empowers the SEC to discipline violators. 8 An investment adviser registered
under the Act is subject to possible revocation or suspension of
registration for "willful" misstatements or omissions in his application
to register, 9 for conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving a
securities transaction, 10 for "willful" violation of a securities act, 11 or
for "aiding and abetting" the violation of a securities act. 12 Section
206,1 3 one of the few substantive sections of the Advisers Act, 14 is a
regulates the activities of those who receive compensation for advising others
with respect to investments in securities or are in the business of issuing analyses or reports concerning securities. Like the Exchange Act, the Advisers Act
requires those subject to its provisions to register with the Commission, prohibits
fraudulent practices, and empowers the Commission to discipline violators of
the statute and of its rules thereunder.
SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwrH, H.R. REP,
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1966) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter SEC
REPORT].
1. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(ll) (1970); Loomis, supra note 6, at 246.
As originally enacted, section 203 of the Act excluded from registration an
investment adviser whose only clients were investment companies. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 203(b)(2), 54 Stat. 850. Investment advisers excluded by
this provision from registering under the Advisers Act were subject only to the
regulations of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,
89 Stat. 164-66. In 1970, this exemption was removed. Investment Company
Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24(a), 84 Stat. 1430. Investment
fund advisers are now subject to the provisions of both acts. The present section 203
of the Advisers Act exempts, inter alia, all investment advisers whose only clients arc
insurance companies. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3(b) (2) (1970).
8. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203, 205, 208-09, 211, 15 U.S.C. §§ S0b3, -5, -8 to -9, -11 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-3 (Supp. Aug. 1975).
9. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(l), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(l)
(Supp. Aug. 1975).
10. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203(e)(2),(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b3(e)(2),(3) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
11. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(4)
(Supp. Aug. 1975).
12. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b3(c)(5)(Supp. Aug. 1975).
Registered investment advisers must also keep "such records, • , . and make , , ,
such reports, as the Commission . . . may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in tho
public interest or for the protection of investors." Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
§ 204, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-4 (Supp. Aug. 1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). Section 206 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artiface to defraud any client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which oper-
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general anti-fraud provision. Its language encompasses a broad
range of adviser misconduct. 15 Because of its breadth and its similarities with rule 10b-5 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, under which
implied causes of action have been recognized since 1946,17 private
plaintiffs seeking recovery under the Advisers Act have correctly
viewed section 206 as the most logical provision upon which to base
their claims. 18
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security
to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other
than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for
the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the
completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining
the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph
shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such
broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction.
( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
14. The other major substantive provisions of the Advisers Act are section 205, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970), which prohibits investment advisers from entering into certain
fee arrangements with their clients and requires the adviser to get his client's consent
before assigning the advisory contract; section 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1970), which
makes it unlawful for any person "willfully" to make an untrue or misleading
statement in any registration material filed pursuant to the Act; and section 208, 15
U.S.C. § S0b-8 (1970), which makes it unlawful for any person registered under the
Act to imply that he is in any way "sponsored, recommended or approved" by the
United States government, or to use the title "investment counsel" unless "a substantial part of his or its business consists of rendering investment supervisory services,"
or to do "indirectly" what it would be unlawful for such person to do "directly" under
the Act. These three provisions can be said to "merge" into section 206. See 2 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961).
15. See text at notes 108-39 infra.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974). Both section 206 and rule lOb-5 are modeled
on section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (a) (1970). See 2
L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1392; 3 id. at 1427.
17. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
18. Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 1974), appears to be the only private
action specifically brought under a different provision of the Advisers Act. In Brouk
v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424
(1962), the particular section of the Advisers Act relied upon by the plaintiff was not
specified by the court.
Most SEC actions taken pursuant to the Advisers Act over the past 35 years have
also involved section 206. See references collected in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ml
56,356-400. Prior to 1960, the SEC had little power to define and enforce violations
of section 206. This lack of enforcement power led Professor Loss to characterize
the Advisers Act as "little more than a continuing census of the Nation's investment
advisers." 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1393. In addition, the section was applicable
only to registered investment advisers. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686,
§ 206, 54 Stat. 852. In 1960, section 206 was amended to give the SEC the power to
"define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent" violations of the section,
and to cover all investment advisers, whether or not exempted from registration under
the Act. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 9, 74 Stat. 887. This latter
change was intended to bring the Advisers Act in line with both the Securities and
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This Note examines the propriety of implying a cause of action
for damages under section 206. Upon concluding that such an
implication is appropriate, it then suggests a scope for section 206
actions that implements the Act's underlying purposes.

I.

THE IMPLICATION DECISION

Courts and commentators20 have devised a variety of theories
for determining when courts should imply private causes of action for
violations of federal regulatory and criminal statutes. In general,
these theories have attempted to interpret and reconcile the few
19

Securities Exchange Acts, which had established a pattern of extending anti-fraud
provisions to nonregistered persons. See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1960).
19. It has been said that, traditionally, courts have implied private rights of action
for violations of criminal statutes when no express private right has been granted
using either of two theories-the "statutory language" theory or the "tort" theory.
See, e.g., Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule J0b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 631-35 (1961); Note, Implied Civil Remedies for
Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758, 768-73
(1974); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 285, 286 (1963).
Under the "statutory language" theory, a court will look to the language of the
statute to find some legislative intent to grant a private right. The court using this
approach is engaged in a form of statutory construction wherein it seeks to discover
what the legislature "had in mind" when drafting the statute in question. See, e.g.,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding
grounds to imply a private right of action for violation of section lO(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act from the provision of that act that states that "contracts in
violation of any provision of the Act shall be void").
Under the "tort" theory of implied private causes of action, statutes that primarily
provide criminal (or, in the case of the securities acts, federal agency) penalties, may
be used by courts as a basis for determining what constitutes "the standard of conduct
of a reasonable man," so long as it is found that the legislative purpose in enacting
the statute was to protect persons in the plaintiff's position from the type of harm that
allegedly resulted from the defendant's violation of the statute. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). For a brief history of the tort theory of implied
private causes of action, see 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 934-36.
Courts, for the most part, do not expressly adopt the statutory language or tort
approach to the implication problem, but the two theories taken together do provide a
framework for understanding how courts have dealt with the problem.
20. See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 943 (should ask whether there are any
good reasons for not implying a private right); Ruder, supra note 19, at 643 (courts
should look for "positive inference" of legislative intent); Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758,
supra note 19, at 774-78 (private cause of action should be implied only when the
act in question reflects a strong national policy); Note, Implied Civil Remedies Under
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 53 B.U. L. REV. 70, 96 (1973)
(implication may not be proper when act provides for an express private right
elsewhere); Note, 77 HA.Rv. L. REV. 285, supra note 19, at 295 (implication not
proper when there is state law that pre-empts area or when there is an adequate
administrative remedy); Note, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a
Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 454, 469 (1968) ("If an adequate remedy
is available . . . either as to deterrence or compensation, a private right should be
denied ....."); Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of I. I.
Case v. Borak, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1150, 1160-61 (1965) (implication may be proper
when violations are very numerous and loss alleged is peculiar to plaintiff).
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Supreme Court decisions dealing with the implication issue21-decisions that, until recently, have left unclear the precise factors that
must be present before the Court will imply a private cause of action.
For example, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 22 the Supreme Court
implied a cause of action for damages in favor of corporate shareholders under the proxy provisions of section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act. 23 In reaching this result, the Court focused on two factors:
legislative intent, gleaned from the jurisdiction provision of the Act, 24
to grant such a cause of action25 and the need for private enforcement
to "supplement . . . Commission action." 26 Ten years later, in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 21 (Amtrak), the Court refused to imply a cause of
action for injunctive relief in favor of potential rail passengers under
section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Act of 197028 (the Amtrak
Act). The Amtrak Court focused on three factors: legislative history, 20 tenets of statutory construction,30 and the legislative purpose of
the Amtrak Act. 31 In the Court's view, all three factors militated
21. See, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra.
22. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
25. 377 U.S. at 430-31.
26. 377 U.S. at 432. The analysis in Borak has been subject to two principal
criticisms. First, it has been said that Borak's use of section 27 (the jurisdiction
provision) of the 1934 Act to find legislative "intent" to imply a private cause of
action under the Act is specious because
. . . specific jurisdictional sections in federal statutes . . . merely indicate
whether Congress intends federal courts to have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of actions arising under the statute. Without section 27 federal courts
would have concurrent jurisdiction of suits under the Act by virtue of the
"federal question" jurisdiction statute. Under that statute, the courts would have
jurisdiction to decide whether a private right of action would not automatically
result. An exclusive grant of jurisdiction should make no difference.
Note, 63 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 454, supra note 20, at 461-62 (footnotes omitted). See
also Comment, supra note 20, at 1161.
The second major criticism of the Barak decision is that the Court failed to
articulate criteria for deciding when a private action should be implied as a "necessary
supplement to Commission action." See 397 U.S. at 433. It has been argued that
without a clear indication of the "relative significance of deterrence and compensation," it will be impossible for a court to know when a private right is necessary in a
particular case. Note, supra, at 465-69.
27. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
28. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part: "If the
Corporation or any railroad engages in . . . any action . . . inconsistent with the
policies and purposes of this chapter . . . the district court of the United States ..•
shall have jurisdiction . . . upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States
or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected
thereby • • • to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate . . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
29. 414 U.S. at 458-61.
30. 414 U.S. at 458.
31. 414 U.S. at 461-64.

314

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:308

against implying a private cause of action for violations of section
307(a). Neither of these decisions made clear whether, before implying a private cause of action, a court must find express legislative
intent to permit such an action, and neither made explicit how the
various relevant factors (for example, legislative intent and legislative
purpose) should be balanced.
In an effort to clarify the confusion generated by its prior decisions, 32 the Supreme Court last term, in Cort v. Ash, 33 outlined the
framework within which the implication decision should be made:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)
(emphasis supplied)-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . .
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?34
Notwithstanding that in Cort v. Ash the Court denied the plaintiff's
request for a cause of action, an examination of section 206 in light of
these four factors clearly suggests that courts should imply private
rights of action in favor of those injured by its violation.
A.

The Class of Benefited Plaintiffs

In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court refused to imply a cause of
action for damages in favor of shareholders of a corporation that had
violated 18 U.S.C. § 610, a criminal statute prohibiting corporate
contributions in connection with a presidential election. 35 According to the Court, the protection of corporate stockholders was only a
secondary purpose of the statute; its principal purpose was to derogate the influence over elections that corporations exercised through
financial contributions. 36 Thus, because the statute was not enacted
32. That !.lie decisions in Borak and Amtrak generated confusion can best be seen
by comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 42123 (3d Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 10, 1975). The majority in
Ash distinguished Amtrak and relied on Borak, inter alia, to imply a cause of action
under 18 U.S.C. § 610. See 496 F.2d at 421-23. The dissent read Amtrak as a retreat from Borak's "liberal" position on implication, see 496 F.2d at 426-29, and thus
would have denied a cause of action under section 610.
·
33. 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 10, 1975).
34. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776.
35. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776.
36. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4777.
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for the "especial benefit" of stockholders, it conferred no federal right
on the plaintiff class.
The first factor used in determining the propriety of implying a
private cause of action, more clearly articulated in Ash than in prior
decisions, is similar in purpose to the requirement of standing. Both
serve to limit access to the courts to those individuals for whose
benefit the statute was enacted, and, under each, the inability of one
plaintiff to qualify does not necessarily preclude other plaintiffs from
qualifying. While all statutes benefit or protect a class of individuals,
all statutes do not confer an "especial benefit" or a federal right on
any class. Similarly, because his interest is too diluted, a prospective
plaintiff within a broad and amorphous class protected by a statute
may fail to obtain standing to sue under that statute. 37 It is doubtful,
however, that the requirements are coterminous. The Court's use in
Ash of the phrase " 'for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,' " 38 instead of the weaker phrase used in standing cases"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute"30-suggests that the former test is the more rigorous.
Moreover, the plaintiff in Ash clearly needed standing to bring his
suit. That the Court found it necessary nevertheless to set forth the
"especial benefit" test further indicates that the Court was constructing a more difficult hurdle.
Section 206 of the Advisers Act was designed to protect investors
in general, and clients and prospective clients of advisers in particular. 40 While the exact limits of the benefited class are subject to
dispute, 41 it is clear that Congress intended to benefit a relatively
specific group of individuals. In this regard section 206 is virtually
identical to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, at issue in
Borak, which was intended to protect corporate investors from management abuses of the proxy mechanism. 42 By way of comparison,
the provision considered in Cort v. Ash benefited the rather amorphous class of all citizens and voters; the provision considered in
Amtrak indirectly benefitted all potential rail passengers. Because
violations of the provisions at issue in Ash and Amtrak could injure
millions of individuals, public enforcement of those provisions seems
desirable. Because violations of section 206 and of section 14(a)
often damage only a small number of individuals, private enforcement of these provisions seems feasible. In short, the specificity of
the class benefited by section 206 suggests that those clearly within
37. Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
38. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776.
39. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
40. See text at notes 140-46 infra.
41. See text at notes 140-65 infra.
42. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
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the class should encounter few difficulties in satisfying this first
requirement for the implication of a cause of action.
B.

Legislative Intent

The presence of clear evidence of legislative intent either to create
or deny a private cause of action is dispositive: Where evidence to
deny exists, courts cannot fairly imply one, and where evidence to
create exists, courts have a duty to implement that intent. In
Amtrak, for example, the Court found explicit evidence that Congress
intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive. The legislative history
of the Amtrak Act revealed that a proposal to re-draft section 307(a)
"so as to provide that any aggrieved party . . . could institute legal
proceedings for violations of the law," was rejected by the House
committee after the Secretary of Transportation objected to the proposal. 43 Of course, legislative intent can be implicit as well as
explicit. One technique courts have employed to discern implicit
intent is to infer from the inclusion of a private remedy in one
provision of a statutory scheme a legislative intent to preclude private
remedies for other provisions. 44 In Ash, however, the Court summarily discredited this method of deriving legislative intent. A valid
inference that the sought-after remedy has been precluded, the
Court noted, arises only when, under the provision at issue rather
than some other provision, plaintiff has some method for obtaining
his desired relief. 45 Finally, and perhaps most commonly, evidence
of legislative intent may be absent. The Court in Ash made clear
that, when this is the case, courts can imply causes of action if appropriate in light of the other three factors. 46
There is no explicit evidence in the reported legislative history of
section 206 that Congress considered the issue of private causes of
actions for damages under that section. In Barak, the Court found
evidence of congressional intent implicit in the jurisdiction provision
of the Securities Exchange Act; 47 it is therefore appropriate to examine the jurisdiction provision-section 214-of the Investment Advisers Act, which reads in pertinent part: "The district courts of the
United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and, concur43. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 459 (1974). Explicit rejection of plaintiffs position by the drafters of an act is
undoubtedly the strongest indication of "legislative intent" a court can find.
44. See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 426-29 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 17, 1975). The remedy provided plaintiff
under the Amtrak Act was to petition the Attorney General to bring suit for an
injunction under the Act.
45. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778 n.14.
46. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778.
47. 377 U.S. at 431.
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rently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin
any violation of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders
thereunder." 48
In Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, 49 one of the two decisions to
consider carefully the propriety of a private damage action under
section 206, the court compared section 214 with the jurisdictionconferring provisions of the Securities Exchange Act50 and the Investment Company Act,5 1 both of which provide that district courts shall
have jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law" brought to
enforce any liability created by the act. 52 The court concluded that
because the words "actions at law" were omitted from section 214, it
could entertain requests under section 206 for equitable relief only. It
therefore dismissed plaintiffs damage action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 53
,
Jurisdiction, or the power to hear a suit, and the propriety of
implying a private cause of action, are issues easily confused. 54 The
omission of "actions at law" from section 214 could mean either that
section 214 does not grant federal courts the power to hear damage
actions under the Advisers Act, 55 or that Congress intended to preclude the implication of damage actions for violations of the A<?t. ll 6
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970) (emphasis added).
49. Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974).
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
51. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970).
52. This same jurisdiction-conferring language is found in section 22 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970), and in section 25 of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1970).
53. Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, Civ. No. 73-638 at 2 (S.D. Fla. May 17,
1974).
The Greenspan court perhaps believed that the difference in the jurisdictional
statutes amply distinguished Borak. Although the Borak Court saw the jurisdiction
section of the 1934 Act as evidence of legislative intent, see 311 U.S. at 433-34, the
decision did not rest on this alone. The Court's examination of the purpose behind
the enactment of section 14(a) was equally important to the outcome in that case. See
Note, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 454, supra note 20, at 460.
54. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 454-55 (1974):
In this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the parties have approached the
question from several perspectives. The issue has been variously stated to be
whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private right of action to enforce compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under the terms of the Act to entertain such a suit; and whether the respondent has standing to bring such a suit. Because the reference in each instance is
to § 307 (a) of the Act and the legislative history behind that provision, these
questions overlap in the context of this case even more than they ordinarily
would.
55. See Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
56. The accountant-defendants in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), argued that "[t]he failure to include
any reference to 'actions at law' can only be interpreted as expressly prohibiting
damage actions under the Advisers Act." Reply Memorandum of Defendant Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath at 4-5.

318

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:308

The Greenspan court apparently adopted the first interpretation.
The court failed to realize, however, that this interpretation does not
resolve the implication question since it leaves federal courts free to
assert jurisdiction under the general federal questionG 7 or diversity of
citizenship58 statutes: once jurisdiction is obtained, a court must then
decide the propriety of implying a cause of action. Arguably, section
214 is an exercise by Congress of its power to limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts59 and precludes courts from asserting jurisdiction under
any jurisdiction statute. Courts have shown extreme reluctance,
however, to conclude that Congress has exercised this power and have
done so only in the face of clear evidence of congressional intent. 00
Because no such evidence underlies section 214, a court following
the Greenspan interpretation of that section must still determine
whether Co_ngress intended to preclude damage actions for violations
of the Adviser's Act. 61
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See Jones Memorial Trust v. Tsai Investment
Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, at 426 (1964).
59. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10
(2d ed. 1970); Note, Post-Conviction Review in the Federal Courts for the Servicemember Not in Custody, 73 MICH. L. REv. 886, 904-06 (1975). There may be due
process constraints on congressional power in this area. See Hart, The Power of
Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise of Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
60. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752-53 (1975).
61. The court in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F.
Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), makes the point that it is possible to read section 214 so
as to confer jurisdiction on federal district courts for damage claims brought under the
Act. Relying on an earlier New York district court opinion, Osborne v. Mallory, 86
F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), the Bolger court concluded that "defendants' argument
overlooks the language of Section 214 which confers jurisdiction over 'violations' of
the statute and the rules promulgated thereunder. . . • The term 'violations' is not
limited to criminal proceedings . . • . It is therefore broad enough to confer
jurisdiction on the district courts for an implied damage action such as the instant
suit." 381 F. Supp. at 264 (emphasis original).
In Osborne, the complaint alleged violations of section 17 of the Securities Act of
1933, and sections lO(b) and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The
court, in sustaining the section l0(b) claim, pointed to the language of section 27 of
the 1934 Act giving federal courts jurisdiction over "violations of this chapter," and
then said, "[t]he word 'violation' is not limited to a criminal case; it includes also
civil litigation." 86 F. Supp. 869 at 879. The language of section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act contains the "at law" reference, however. See 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (1970). The Osborne court thus merely determined that civil actions "at law or
equity" were equally cognizable with criminal actions "at law or equity" under that
act. The Bolger court overlooked the limited nature of the Osborne holding. Reading
the word "violations" in section 214 of the Advisers Act so as to include civil
violations as well as criminal violations docs not circumvent the problem of the
absence of the "at law" language in this section. Read literally, construing "violations" to mean both civil and criminal violations, the section confers federal jurisdic-
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As pointed out in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 62 the second decision considering section 206 damage actions, the legislative history of the Advisers Act contains no evidence
that Congress intended to differentiate section 214 from the jurisdictional provisions of other securities legislation. 63 The only reference
to section 214 can be found in a passage of the Senate report64 that
comments on the enforcement provisions of the Act in general; it
states that they are "generally comparable" to those of the Investment
Company Act, 65 the jurisdiction section of which contains the "at
law" language. 66 This comparison negates any inference from
section 214 that, by omitting the "at law" language, Congress explicitly intended to preclude damage actions under the Advisers Act.
Other methods of deriving implicit legislative. intent yield equally
inconclusive results. Section 215(b) of the Advisers Act67 provides
that "[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this
subchapter . . . shall be void . . . . " The court in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co. 68 viewed a similar provision in the Securities
Exchange Act as affirmative evidence of congressional intent to allow
private parties to assert claims under that Act. While such an
inference from section 215 is possible, it is arguably offset by indications in the Act's legislative history of congressional reluctance to
"over-regulate" the advisory industry, 60 which suggest a desire to
tion over all violations "of all suits in equity" and still excludes the assertion of
jurisdiction over private damage claims.
The Bolger court's alternative explanation of how to read section 214 is perhaps
more accurate: "Unlike each of the other securities laws, the Advisers Act does not
contain any provision expressly authorizing a civil action by a private person injured
by a violation of one of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, it was necessary in
those statutes to make reference to 'actions at law' in the jurisdictional sections. Such
a provision was unnecessary in the Advisers Act." 381 F. Supp. at 264-65 (emphasis
original; footnote omitted). In the absence of any evidence that Congress intended
to single out this Act as one under which private rights, whether express or implied,
were inappropriate, this may very well explain why section 214 was drafted as it was.
62. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
63. 381 F. Supp. at 264.
64. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 23 (1940).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
66. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1970).
68. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
69. It is clear that, as enacted, the Investment Advisers Act represented a
compromise between the SEC and the investment advisory industry. See S. REP. No.
1775, supra note 64, at 20-21. In the congressional debate over the passage of the
Advisers Act, concern over weaknesses in the regulatory aspects of the Act, such as
the exemption from registration for lawyers, accountants, and teachers who give
investment advice only "incidental[ly]" to their main business, § 202(a)(ll}(B), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll}(B) (1970), and the lack of any educational or professional
requirements for registration under the Act, was voiced. See 86 CONG. REC. 9814
(1940) (remarks of Representative Hinshaw). Because there was strong congressional feeling that both the investment company and investment advisory industries
were essential to the national economy and should not be jeopardized, see 86 CONG.
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minimize the potential liability of advisers. 70 In sum, there is neither
explicit nor implicit evidence of congressional intent to create or deny
a cause of action for damages under section 206.

C.

Legislative Purpose

Like the other securities acts, the Investment Advisers Act is both
"remedial" and regulatory;71 its principal purpose is the encouragement of investment by providing adequate protection against fraudulent manipulations by dishonest advisers. 72 The relevant report of
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency states: "The nature
of the functions of investment advisers, their increasing widespread
activities, their potential influence on security markets and the dangerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon unsophisticated investors, convinces this committee that protection of investors
requires the regulation of investment advisers on a national scale." 73
In 1940 Congress was particularly concerned with the state of the
economy; industry in general and the defense industry in particular
needed the financial impetus that private investment could provide. 74
Following the stock market crash of 1929, the public had become
increasingly cautious about investing without professional consultaREC. 9815 (remarks of Representative Wolverton), the Advisers Act was enacted
without additional restrictions.
The lack of educational requirements for registration as an investment adviser
under the Act has been seen by commentators as the "major" inadequacy of the Act,
See 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1415; Comment, supra note 6, at 75. Cf.
Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1967) (the occupation of
investment adviser is "an occupation which can cause havoc unless engaged in by
those with appropriate background and standards").
70. See Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers,, 14 STAN. L. REV, 827, 837
(1962).
71. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
72. See note 6, supra, for examples of advisory industry practices that led to the
enactment of the Investment Advisers Act.
73. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21. See also H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940): "The essential purpose of [the Advisers Act] is to protect
the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts
and to safeguard the honest investment adviser against the stigma of the activities of
these individuals by making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful,"
74. The congressional reports accompanying the Investment Company Act of
1940, title I of the bill of which the Advisers Act was title II, are illuminating in this
respect. The Senate report states: "Finally, a most significant function of investment
companies in relation to the immediate needs of the national economy is their
potential usefulness in the supply of new capital to industry, particularly to small and
promotional ventures. . . . [I]t is the hope of the committee • . . that regulation of
investment companies, as provided for in this bill, may stimulate venture capital and
the financing of industry." S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 5. The House report
adds: "[P]roper and reasonable regulation of investment companies may substantially
stimulate investment companies to supply new capital for the expansion of industry,
particularly industries vital to the national defense ...•" H.R. REP. No, 2639,
supra note 73, at 5.
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tion. 711 Aware of and seeking to protect the "fiduciary nature" of the
relationship between adviser and client, 76 Congress passed the Advisers Act with the aim of "substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achiev[ing] a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry." 77
Given these underlying purposes, the implication of a private
cause of action under section 206 is appropriate. First, it is obvious
that section 206 is similar to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act,
considered in Barak. Both provisions protect investors by proscribing certain manipulative practices and both are ostensibly enforced by
the SEC. In Barak, the Court implied a cause of action for damages;78 the same result seems warranted under section 206.
Second, the remedies expressly provided in the Advisers Act for
violations of its provisions are insufficient to accord full relief to
injured clients and are by no means frustrated by the implication of a
cause of action for damages. Section 206 ( 4) of the Advisers Act79
grants the SEC the power to define and "prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent" fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative acts for
the purpose of determining what constitutes a violation of that provision. 80 The Commission's enforcement powers, set forth in section
203(e),81 are in general limited to denying registration to, revoking
or suspending the registration of, placing limitations on the activities
of, or "censuring"82 an investment adviser who violates the Advisers
Act, "if it finds . . . that such censure, denial, placing of limitations,
suspension, or revocation is in the public interest." 83 The Commission is given full "investigative" powers under the Act, "[w]henever
it shall appear to the Commission, either upon complaint or other75. See Comment, supra note 6, at 69.
76. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92
(1963) (summarizing the legislative history).
77. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
78. The Borak Court found that the "protection of investors" language in section
14(a) "implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that
result." 377 U.S. at 432.
79. For the text of this provision, see note 13 supra.
80. For a discussion of how the SEC has interpreted section 206, see text at notes
107-35 infra.
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
82. Section 206 was amended in 1960 to apply to all investment advisers, whether
registered under the Act or not. See note 18 supra. Until the 1975 amendment to
the Act that added the phrase "placing limitations on the activities of," Commission
"censure" was the only form of enforcing the prohibitions of section 206 against
unregistered advisers, aside from possible imposition of criminal penalties. The
Commission also uses the more lenient "censure" device against advisers who have
violated the Act when it finds "mitigating circumstances"-usually an attempt by the
adviser to make good his wrong. See, e.g., Axe Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 381, 384
(1964).
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp._Aug. 1975).
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wise, that the provisions of [the Act] or of any rule or regulation
prescribed under the authority thereof, have been or are about to be
violated by any person." 84 The Commission may, "in its discretion,"
bring a district court action to enjoin violations of the Act, or it may
transmit evidence of such a violation to the Attorney General, "who,
in his discretion, may institute the appropriate criminal proceeding."s5
Thus, the only remedy provided by the Act to investors who are
injured by the fraudulent acts of their advisers is to file a complaint
with the SEC and await Commission action. 86 While in Amtrak the
Court found a similar remedy 87 sufficiently effective to implement the
purposes of the Amtrak Act, 88 the situation of the plaintiff passenger
association in that case is clearly distinguishable. First, the principal
purpose of the Amtrak Act was not to protect the plaintiffs. Second,
the plaintiff in Amtrak sought a remedy-an injunction halting a proposed rail line discontinuance-already provided by the Act, although in a less direct manner. Finally, there existed clear evidence
that Congress intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive. On the
other hand, the principal purpose of the Advisers Act is to protect
investors, plaintiffs asserting a damage claim under section 206 seek a
remedy not provided by the Act, and there is no evidence that
Congress wanted the statutory remedy to be exclusive. Cort v. Ash is
also of little guidance, for there the remedy sought was one traditionally provided by state corporation laws. From this fact, the Court
inferred that Congress intended to leave the remedy to the discretion
of the states.80 Because the regulation of investment advisers is
predominated by federal supervision, 00 such an inference in the context of section 206 is unreasonable.
Finally, the implication of a cause of action for damages under
section 206 protects investors more fully. In Borak, the Court
84. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1970).
85. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
86. An argument might be advanced here, based on the maxim of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the expression of one remedy in
the Advisers Act implies that other remedies are precluded. Cf. National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
However, use of exclusio unius was discredited in the context of private actions by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. See text at note 45 supra. Cf. Comment, Prival£'
Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers: Amended Section 36 of
the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 143, 158-60 (1971) (rejecting the argument with
respect to section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940).
87. Plaintiff's remedy under the Amtrak Act is to file a complaint with the
Attorney General of the United States. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
88. 414 U.S. at 464.
89. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778.
90. See text at notes 102-05 infra.
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supported its implication of a damage action by noting the inability of
the SEC to examine carefully all of the proxy statements it received01
and by noting the deterrent value of private damage actions. 02 Similarly, the SEC cannot supervise and investigate the activities of all
advisers, and section 206 private damage actions would doubtless
encourage compliance. 93 Both Congress04 and the SEC95 have
voiced concern over the adequacy of enforcement of the Advisers Act.
Allowing private plaintiffs to sue under section 206 would serve to
"supplement" SEC enforcement and thus would aid the SEC in
"maintaining the confidence of the public in the processes of capital
formation and securities trading." 96 Such private actions would also
serve to compensate plaintiffs for what oftentimes are egregious
losses° 7-a result consistent with that of many recent cases adopting
a liberal approach toward allowing recovery under various provisions
of the securities acts. 98 Any concern over subjecting investment advisers to undue liability that stems from the fact that Congress has
never seen fit to regulate the day-to-day activities of advisers can be
accommodated by carefully "shaping" the right of action under section 206, rather than by denying it altogether. In sum, the implication
of a private cause of action for damages under section 206 would be
consistent with, and in fact would further, the underlying purpose of
the Act.
91. 377 U.S. at 432.
92. 377 U.S. at 432.
93. The SEC is empowered to investigate advisers only after it has reason to
believe that the Act has been or is about to be violated. Investment Advisers Act of
1940, § 209(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1970). Knowledge of possible civil damage
liability would undoubtedly have a stronger deterrent effect than would knowledge
that, if the violation is brought to the attention of the SEC, that agency may then
begin to investigate.
94. See S. REP. No. 1760, supra note 18, at 4: "A major concern of the bill [to
amend the Investment Advisers Act] is to aid the Commission in enforcing compliance with the act. There are at present over ½ million individuals in the United
States who own corporate securities, .nearly double those•in 1952 . . . . [11his new
group offers strong temptation to confidence men and swindlers who may give them
biased advice or misuse their funds or securities."
95. See SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 343-46.
96. SEC, REPORT OF TIIE ADVISORY COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 5 ( 1972). The SEC filed an amicus curiae memorandum supporting a
claim for a private right of action under the Advisers Act in Hull v. Newman,
Kennedy & Co., No. 118-283 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1957). The Hull case was
apparently settled before this issue was resolved.
97. See, e.g., Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp.
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ($2.4 million damages alleged).
98. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 ( 1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
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StateLaw

The final factor set forth in Ash is whether the cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state law and in an area in which state
law predominates. 99 In Cort v. Ash, plaintiff stockholders sought to
require defendant corporate directors to repay corporate funds illegally expended on a presidential election.100 The Court found significant the fact that state law regulates the relationships between shareholders, corporations, and corporate directors, and provides methods
for shareholders to remedy director actions that are ultra vires. 101
Because the area was pervaded by state law and not one traditionally
the subject of federal regulation, this factor in Ash militated against
the implication of a federal cause of action.
State law in the context of investor/ advisor relations is and traditionally has been sparse. 102 Although twenty-seven states now have
anti-fraud statutes that deal specifically with the dispensing of investment advice, 103 most of these statutes have only recently been enacted
and only one expressly provides for a civil cause of action against
fraudulent investment advisers. 104 Moreover, federal regulation has
served as a model in this area, and thus has not infringed upon
extant statutory schemes: The bulk of these statutes are fashioned after section 102 of the Uniform Securities Act, whose
language in tum is taken from sections 206(1) and (2) of the
Advisers Act. 105 Thus, because the implication of a federal cause of
action would not conflict with long-established state laws or state
interests, this factor does not counsel against judicial implication of a
damage action.
99. See text at note 34 supra.
100. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4775.
101. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778.
102. See, e.g., SEC, Report of the Advisory Comm. on Investment Management
Services for Individual Investors, Jan. 18, 1973, at 63; Note, supra note 70, at 834.
103. ALAS. STAT. § 45.55.020 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1236 (1966); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25235 (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-338(b)
(1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-25(b) (1968); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1404 (1967); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 21 1/2, § 137.121 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE§
23-2-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1253(b) (1974); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 292.320 (1972); Mo. CoRP. & AssN. CODE ANN. § 11-302 (1975); MICH.
CoMP. LAws § 451.502 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 80A.02 (Supp. 1975); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 409.102 (1969); MONT. REv. CooES ANN. § 15-2005(2) (1967); NED. REV.
STAT. § 8-1102(2) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-53 (1970); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 48-18-29B (1966); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page 1964); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 102 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-404 (Supp. 1975); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-202 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-2 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-503 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.020 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.44
(1975); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 17-117.2 (1965).
104. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page 1964).
105. UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 102, Comment .01.
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THE ScOPE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

As one commentator has stated with regard to private causes of
action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act: "It does
not follow [from the implication of a cause of action] that every
minor infraction of the proxy rules-such as mailing to the Commission only three rather than four copies of the annual report-will
automatically invalidate the proxies." 100 Nor need it follow from the
implication of a cause of action under section 206 that all violations
of that section will subject advisers to private damage liability. In
exercising their discretion, federal courts should tailor the cause of
action under section 206 to effectuate the principal purpose of the
Advisers Act-the preservation of the fiduciary relationship between
advisers and investors.
This section proposes a scope for damage actions under section
206; first, it outlines the substantive content of section 206 as interpreted by the SEC and enforced by the courts, and then, in light of
the purpose of the Act, delineates the damage action by defining
classes of plaintiffs and defendants, and establishing standards of
causation and scienter.
A. Substantive Content of Section 206
The SEC has broad definitional and rulemaking powers under
section 206 and has used those powers to describe practices it considers "fraudulent," "manipulative," or "deceptive" within the meaning
of that section. Because of the SEC's familiarity with the problems
of investors and the practices of advisers, federal courts should give
weight to these substantive interpretations. However, because the
adverse consequences to the advisory industry of subjecting investment advisers to damage liability may be far greater than the adverse
consequences of subjecting them to agency disciplinary proceedings, 107 courts should reject SEC interpretations where appropriate to
further legislative intent.
For convenience, the SEC interpretations discussed here are divided into three groups: conduct involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure, conduct not involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure
that is nevertheless fraudulent or deceptive, and conduct involving
adviser/client fee arrangements (which may or may not fit into either
of the other categories).
1.

Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure

Adviser advertising is one area in which the SEC has frequently
106. 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 943.
107. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 n.40
(1963).
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found nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Rule 206(4)-1 108 prohibits an investment adviser from including in advertising material (1)
testimonials by former clients, (2) past specific recommendations
made by the adviser unless the advertisement offers to supply the
potential client with a list of all recent recommendations, (3) graphs,
charts, or other formulae that purportedly aid the client in making
investment decisions unless the advertisement "prominently discloses"
the limitations and difficulties of using such formulae, (4) any offer
of "free" services to clients unless the services are indeed free, and
(5) any statements that are false or misleading. 100
The SEC has also determined that section 206 is violated by
misrepresentations and nondisclosure in advisory publications and
direct statements to clients. 110 In particular, the SEC has found
violations of section 206 in the publication of misleading statements
about the background and experience of the adviser111 or the corporations in which the adviser has urged his clients to invest,112 in the
making of false and deceptive statements to clients about the price at
which they could purchase certain stock, 113 and in the failure to
disclose to clients to whom notices of the assignment of their advisory
contracts were sent that the contracts could not be assigned without
their consent. 114
Finally, the Commission has found nondisclosure or misrepresentation violative of section 206 in the area of adviser conflicts of
interest. Under section 206(3), any adviser acting as a principal for
his own account (or acting as a broker for another client's account)
108. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1975).
109. For applications of the rule see, for example, Killgore Management, Inc.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 78,977 (SEC Aug. 25, 1972)
(rule violated by advertisement failing to disclose that securities listed in sample
portfolio were arbitrarily selected and showed fortuitous profits and losses); Shortline
Reports, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 77,962 (SEC
Feb. 22, 1971) (false, misleading, deceptive, flamboyant, and excessively dramatic
newspaper advertisements); Axe Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 381 (1964) (violation
where not disclosed that adviser paid for article appearing in book distributed to
prospective brides that described adviser as "outstanding" and "nationally recognized").
110. There is as yet no rule under section 206 dealing specifically with misrepresentations or omissions made by advisers directly to their clients. A proposed rule
206(4)-3 dealing with "investment advisory communications," set out in Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 231 (Oct. 10, 1968), [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 1177,612, was not adopted by the SEC. See generally Comment,
SEC Regulation of Investment Advisers, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 1230 (urging adoption of
the proposed rule).
111. See Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 539 (1965).
112. See Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 ·s.E.C. 539 (1965); Bridwell & Co., [19641966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 77,183 (SEC Dec. 18, 1964).
113. See Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373 (1964).
114. See Bridwell & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED, SEc. L. REP.
1177,183 (SEC Dec. 18, 1964).
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who sells or purchases a security to or from a client must disclose
his interest and obtain the client's consent before effecting the transaction.115 The SEC has maintained:
The disclosure should include, as a minimum, (a) the capacity in
which the investment adviser proposes to act, (b) the cost to the adviser of any security which he proposes to sell to his client (or, if
he proposes to buy a security from his client and knows or is ·reasonably certain of the price at which it is to be resold, a statement of
that price), and (c) the best price at which the transaction could be
effected by or for the client elsewhere if such price is more advantageous to the client than the actual purchase or sale price. Moreover, any disclosure of the cost to the investment adviser (or the price
he expects to receive on resale) should be so phrased that its full import is obvious to the client.11 6

Section 206(3) is principally aimed at adviser "scalping"-that
is, purchasing stock prior to recommending it to clients and then
selling it after the market has shifted due to the adviser's recommendations. In 1963, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 117
the Supreme Court held that the SEC could obtain an injunction
requiring advisers to make full disclosure of the practice to clients. On
the basis of the legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act, the
Court concluded that the Act "reflect[ed] a congressional recognition
'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory
relationship.' " 118 Although the Court refused to conclude that section 206 prohibits all trading by an investment adviser in securities in
which his clients have an interest, 119 the SEC has used the Court's
reasoning to revoke the registration of an adviser who engaged in
"scalping" at a loss: "Even though the shares were sold at a loss, the
recommendation by [the investment adviser] of a stock in which [its
president] was trading without revealing his personal interest in that
stock constitutes fraudulent conduct." 120

2.

Fraudulent and Deceptive Practices

While emphasizing nondisclosure and misrepresentation, the SEC
has decided that certain adviser practices are prima facie violations of
section 206 notwithstanding full disclosure to clients. In this category are various arrangements between investment advisers and
broker-dealers: ( 1) the interpositioning, by an adviser, of a brokerdealer between a mutual fund and a second broker-dealer who actually
115. For the text of this provision, see note 13 supra.
116. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40 (Jan. 5, 1945), 4 CCH
REP. ,r 56,375, at 44,104.
117. 375U.S.180 (1963).
118. 375 U.S. at 191, quoting 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1412.
119. 375 U.S. at 196.
120. Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373, 379 (1964).
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effects the fund's transactions, 121 (2) an arrangement between a
broker-dealer and an investment adviser whereby the adviser
"recapture[s]" part of the commission paid by the adviser's clients to
the broker-dealer, 122 (3) an arrangement whereby a broker-dealer
receives part of the fee paid by a client to his investment adviser in
return for recommending the adviser to the client and performing
certain services for the adviser, 123 and (4) an arrangement whereby
an investment adviser directs individual portfolios that he manages to
a broker-dealer in return for credit against subscription or equipment
expenses. 124.
The SEC has also ruled that certain adviser/ client agreements are
prima facie violations of section 206. One ruling involved a "Memorandum of Agreement" sent by the advisor to each of her clients. The
memorandum stated that the adviser would act as principal in all
transactions involving her clients' accounts unless otherwise agreed.
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC's revocation of
the adviser's registration in this instance notwithstanding an amicus
brief, urging reversal, filed by 120 of the adviser's 175 clients. 12 G In
another ruling, 120 the SEC concluded that section 206 would ,be violated by an "earnest money" agreement entered into between an adviser and a prospective client whereby the adviser would credit the
prospective client's deposit against future adviser's fees but keep the
deposit if no advisory contract were ultimately signed.
The list of prima facie violations of section 206 also includes most
adviser dealings in client funds. Rule 206(4)-2127 prohibits any
adviser "who has custody or possession of any funds or securities in
which any client has any beneficial interest" from taking any action
with respect to those funds or securities unless (1) the securities are
segregated, identified, and kept in a reasonably secure place, (2) the
121. Delaware Management Co., 43 S.E.C. 392 (1967).
122. Provident Management Corp., 44 S.E.C. 442 (1970). The SEC found this
practice to be violative of section 206 despite the fact that no injury to the adviser's
client had been shown: "While there is no proof that Fund [client] did not receive
the best execution on its transactions, or that the existence of the arrangements
described resulted in additional costs to Fund, once the reciprocal arrangements were
made, it was improper for [the adviser] to keep for itself rather than confer on Fund
the benefits attributable to Fund's assets." 44 S.E.C. at 447.
123. Reinholdt & Gardner, SEC no-action letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,120 (March 25, 1971 ).
124. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC no-action letter, (1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,120 (March 27, 1973). The letter did suggest
that the arrangement might be condoned if the full benefit of the adviser's reduction
in expenses was passed on to the clients. (1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. at 83,098.
125. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
126. James L. Nollkamper, SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,664 (Dec. 21, 1971 ).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (1975).
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funds are kept in a separate bank account maintained in the adviser's
name as trustee and the adviser keeps separate records of each
account, (3) the adviser gives written notice to his clients as to where
the funds or securities are kept, (4) the adviser sends an itemized
record of such funds or securities to each client at least once every
three months, and (5) all funds are verified at least once each year by
an independent public accountant, without prior notice to the adviser,
and a copy of the accountant's certificate is filed with the SEC.

3.

Fee Arrangements

The SEC has proscribed under section 206 certain adviser/ client
fee arrangements. In this area, the Commission has relied principally
on findings of nondisclosure and misrepresentation but has suggested
as well that, with regard to unsophisticated or naive investors, no
amount of disclosure will suffice. 128 In the case of fees charged for
advisory services, the SEC has determined that any adviser desiring to
charge more than "the normal fee charged by the advisory industry"
must "disclose to existing and potential clients not only that its fee is
higher than normal, but the extent to which its fee is higher than
normal." 129 Generalizing, the Commission has stated:
[W]hether or not a particular act, practice or course of business
would operate as a fraud on a client is a question of act [sic]. Accordingly, whether or not the Adviser's disclosure with respect to fees
would be adequate in a particular case would depend on the totality
of the circumstances in which such disclosure is made including the
manner in which it is made, and the sophistication of the particular

client. 130
Two statutory provisions in the investment area that expressly
regulate compensation agreements shed light on the content of section 206. Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act prohibits registered investment advisers from entering into or performing under an
investment advisory contract that, inter alia, "provides for compensation to the investment adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains
upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds
of the client."m This section is inapplicable to advisers exempt from
registration under the Act, to advisory contracts between an adviser
128. See Roman S. Gorski, [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(SEC Dec. 22, 1967) (dictum).
129. Rotan Mosle, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 79,961, at 84,476 (July 24, 1974) (emphasis original). Accord,
Commodity Management Serv. Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 79,805, at 84,184 (April 19, 1974).
130. Rotan Mosle, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.1f 79,961 (July 24, 1974). See generally Comment, supra note 86,
at 146.
131. 15 U.S.C. § S0b-5(1) (1970).
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and an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act, and to contracts "relat[ing] to the investment of assets in
excess of $1 million." 132 According to Professor Loss,1 33 section 205
"merges" with section 206 so that conduct violative of section 205 is
"fraudulent" and "deceptive" within the meaning of section 206.
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act,1 34 added in
1970, provides an express cause of action in favor of clients of
investment company advisers who "breach [their] fiduciary duty" in
the setting of advisory fees. Presumably, conduct proscribed by
section 36(b) also would be actionable under section 206. The
cause of action set forth in section 36(b), however, is circumscribed
in some very important respects: Suit may be brought only against the
investment adviser, recovery may not be had for damages sustained
more than one year before the institution of the action, and damages
are limited to the amount of compensation received by the adviser. 131i
To assure that these congressionally imposed limitations on the section 36 (b) cause of action are not circumvented, courts could exclude
excessive fee arrangements from the reach of section 206, or they
could apply the section 36(b) limitations to all suits under section
206 involving adviser fees. A third and more appropriate alternative,
however, would be to apply the section 36(b) limitations only to suits
under section 206 brought against advisers who are also within the
reach of the Investment Company Act. The first alternative is unnecessarily cautious. While dealing with all advisers uniformly, the
second alternative is less attractive than the third because it fails to
maximize client recovery of legitimate damages and because it applies
limitations on the cause of action outside of the narrow context in
which those limitations were considered by Congress.
4.

The Rationale: Adviser as Fiduciary

Underlying these SEC applications of section 206 is the idea that
investment advisers are fiduciaries and as such are charged with the
obligations and responsibilities of dealing in utmost good faith. 1311
This viewpoint, supported by the Act's legislative history and by the
132. 15 U.S.C. § S0b-5 (1970).
133. 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1412.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1970).
136. The SEC has characterized an investment adviser as "a fiduciary who is
prohibited from engaging in any activity in conflict with the interest of his clients."
Ernest Hack, SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1f 78,426, at 80,936 (Sept. 9, 1971). Thus, conduct that puts the investment
adviser "in a position wherein his personal interests might govern any action taken for
his clients," is seen as violating section 206. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC
no-action letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 79,377, at 83,098
(March 27, 1973).
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Supreme Court's decision in Capital Gains, should be adopted by
courts in constructing a section 206 private cause of action.
The focus on the fiduciary nature of the adviser/ client relationship differentiates section 206 from, for example, rule lOb-5, which is
aimed at eliminating nondisclosure and misrepresentation rather than
at preserving a fiduciary relationship. While full disclosure of a
transaction usually absolves individuals of lOb-5 liability, 137 a sufficiently unfair transaction should give rise to section 206 liability notwithstanding the disclosure, so long as the requisite causation is
established. One decision in which the court failed to notice this
significant difference between section 206 and rule l0b-5 is Jones
Memorial Trust v. Tsai Investment Services, Inc. 138 There, plaintiffs
alleged that mismanagement by an investment adviser of the "process
of research and recommending investment transactions" violated both
provisions. Lumping the provisions together, the court concluded
that, since the alleged mismanagement was fully disclosed, neither
provision was violated. 139 This result seems improper if the section
206 private cause of action is to protect the fiduciary nature of the
adviser/ client relationship and proscribe substantive as well as procedural unfairness.
B.

The Plaintiff Class

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, it is clear
that the question of who can sue under section 206 is answered by
applying the traditional test for standing and by discerning from the
substance and legislative history of the Advisers Act the intended
beneficiaries of section 206. These two inquiries overlap (the standing determination whether a prospective plaintiff is within a statute's
zone of interest is subsumed in the determination whether he is within
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted) and thus
· merge into a twofold test: has the plaintiff suffered injury in fact,
and does he satisfy the Ash "especial benefit" test. Since the first
half of the test is basically a question of fact, the determination of
who can sue under section 206 turns on the· sec.and half of the test.
This section isolates the class for whose especial benefit the Advisers
Act in general and section 206 in particular were enacted.
Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act make it unlawful
for an investment adviser to engage in any act ,that operates as a fraud
upon any client or prospective client. Section 206(3) speaks of the
relationship between the adviser and client. Section 206(4), on the
other hand, omits the client/prospective client language and makes
137. See Note, The Controlling bzfluence Standard in Rule J0b-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1007, 1040-43 (1973).
138. 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
139. 367 F. Supp. at 497.
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unlawful all fraudulent conduct, as that term is defined by the SEC.
The specific language in sections 206(1), (2), and (3) suggests that
clients and, in some cases, "prospective clients"140 of advisers are the
intended beneficiaries of section 206 and should be able to bring
private damage suits under that section. The question remains,
however, whether any person who suffers financial injury as a result
of an adviser's violation of section 206 should have access to the
section 206 cause of action.
Limitation of the section 206 cause of action to clients or prospective clients of investment advisers would exclude from recovery a
potentially large class of individuals injured by violations of the
section. This class would include persons who were essentially "tippees" of the adviser's clients-that is, persons who received and relied
on to their detriment incomplete or inaccurate information promulgated by an adviser and relayed by one of the adviser's clients. The
class would also include members of the public at large who, for
example, while not themselves "subscribers," read an advisory publication containing false information and suffered subsequent economic
loss in reliance upon that information. 141 If the primary function of
section 206 private causes of action is either the deterrence of all
fraudulent conduct by advisers or the compensation of all losses
flowing from violations of section 206, then it seems desirable to
extend the action to these potential plaintiffs. If the purpose behind
constructing a private cause of action is viewed more restrictively,
however, as preserving and protecting a specialized relationship of
•trust between adviser and client, then the exclusion of nonclients from
suit under section 206 seems appropriate.
There are several reasons for a court to adopt the more restrictive
stance in determining the plaintiff class for section 206 actions. As
noted above, 142 the SEC has characterized investment advisers as
fiduciaries and has defined the scope of their obligations under
section 206 in terms of "fiduciary duties." The principle that accords
substantial weight to the interpretation of a statute by the department
entrusted with its administration143 therefore counsels courts to limit
140. The meaning of the term "prospective client" is discussed in the text at and
following note 156 infra.
141. It is difficult to think of a violation of section 206 not involving misreprcsen•
tation or fraudulent omission for which a nonclient could maintain an action under
that provision, assuming that courts demand some showing that the adviser's violation
caused plaintifrs injury.
142. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
143. "[I]t has long been established that the question of the inclusion of a
particular person or entity within the coverage of a regulatory statute is generally for
initial determination by an agency, subject to review on direct appeal, rather than for
a district court . . . ." SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). But cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282,
286 (1971) (principle inapplicable when agency regulations conflict with statute).

December 1975]

Section 206 Private Actions

333

the scope of the adviser's liability to those persons to whom fiduciary
duties are owed. Injury ,to persons other than clients and prospective
clients, while perhaps forseeable from the point of view of the deceptive investment adviser, cannot be said to flow from the breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the injured nonclients without expanding the
fiduciary concept beyond recognition.
The focus of the legislative history of the Advisers Act on preservation of the fiduciary relationship also supports limiting the class of
plaintiffs in section 206 actions. Although the history contains references to the protection of "investors" 144 and the "public,"145 it is
apparent from the context of those references, and from an examination of the kinds of adviser activities prevalent before 1940 that
Congress sought to eliminate, 146 that Congress intended to protect
only those investors and members of the public who had consulted
investment advisers.
Also instructive is that, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress
desired to avoid overregulating the advisory industry. 147 In its view,
the increasing technicalities of the marketplace created a need for
advisers possessing a level of knowledge and expertise well beyond
that of the ordinary investor. Excessive regulation, it feared, would
discourage qualified individuals from entering the field-a consequence more undesirable than leaving certain activities unregulated.
Limiting the plaintiff class to clients and prospective clients is a
reasonable means of accommodating this congressional desire.
Implicit support for this limitation on the plaintiff class underlies
the Third Circuit's decision in Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc. 148
There, plaintiff shareholders of certain mutual funds brought suit
against, inter alia, allegedly malfeasant investment advisers to a large
group of mutual_ funds, under various securities acts including the
Investment Advisers Aot. The court held that plaintiffs could bring
suit only against advisers of the funds in which the plaintiffs held
stock and were limited to bringing derivative actions on behalf of
those funds rather than direct aotions. In the investment company
setting, the adviser's client is the company rather than its shareholders. In limiting the action in the investment company context to
bona fide shareholders bringing derivative actions, the court assured
that only the adviser's client would recover.
Finally, support for limiting the plaintiff class is provided by the
two policy considerations set forth by the Supreme Court last term in
144.
supra.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21, quoted in the text at note 73
See H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 73, at 28, quoted in note 73 supra.
See note 6 supra.
See note 69 supra and text at notes 69-70 supra.
434 F.2d 727 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 149 in which the Court
upheld the viability of the purchaser/seller requirement1 :;o in private
suits under rule lOb-5. The Court noted that the elimination of the
purchaser/seller requirement "would throw open to the trier of fact
many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depended
almost entirely on oral testimony."m The determination whether a
plaintiff would have purchased or sold securities but for the rule 1Ob5 violation would be based in many instances on merely the uncorroborated oral evidence of the plaintiff:
The jury would not even have the benefit of weighing the plaintiff's
version against the defendant's version, since the elements to which
the plaintiff would testify would be in many cases totally unknown
and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in permitting
those in respondent's position to sue under Rule lOb-5 is that the door
will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one
who offers only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted
a prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, or that
the representations contained in it damaged him. . . . In the absence of the [purchaser/seller requirement], bystanders to the securities marketing process could await developments on the sidelines
without risk, claiming that inaccuracies in disclosure caused nonselling
in a falling market and that unduly pessimistic predictions by the issuer followed by a rising market caused them to allow retrospectively
golden opportunities to pass. 162

The purchaser/seller requirement viewed in this light thus serves as a
rule of corroboration. The Court also emphasized that the effective
elimination of the purchaser/seller requirement would create a grave
potential for nuisance or "strike" suits and for misuse of the discovery
procedure. 153 Without such a requirement, virtually any plaintiff
could make a colorable allegation of injury sufficient to withstand
motions for dismissal or summary judgment since the inquiry in each
case would involve delicate factual questions not subject to summary
disposition. The resulting prospect of extensive discovery of business
documents and the deposition of officers and associates, the disruptive effect of which would be costly to the defendant organization,
would thus accord essentially groundless suits a substantial settlement
value.
These considerations apply with equal force in the context of
section 206 and encourage courts to employ a fairly rigid client/potential-client requirement. The trier of fact, in determining whether
a nonclient plaintiff relied upon and was injured by an adviser's
149. 43 U.S.L.W. 4707 (June 9, 1975).
150. For further discussion of the purchaser/seller requirement in the context of
both rule l0b-5 and section 206, see text at and following notes 159-61 infra.
151. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4713.
152. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4714.
153. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4712-13.
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fraudulent activities, would in most cases be forced to rely totally
upon uncorroborated oral testimony, as in the l0b-5 context. Moreover, the absence of a client/potential-client requirement would
present an unreasonable prospect of vexatious "strike" suits and of
misuse of the discovery process.
If courts limit the class of section 206 plaintiffs to clients and
prospective clients of investment advisers, they must determine what
persons those categories encompass. Few problems arise in determining who is a client: once an advisory contract is entered into, 154 or
an advisory fee is paid, 155 the relationship is clear. Problems do
arise, however, in defining "prospective clients." The SEC has never
adequately defined the term, although it has employed the "prospective clients" language of sections 206(1) and (2) for the purpose of
taking administrative action against an adviser. The SEC concluded
in Ralph Howard Seipel, 156 the only action in which the term has had
much significance, that "prospective clients" included persons actually solicited by the adviser for the purpose of making them clients.
While that case involved direct telephone communications with persons answering the adviser's newspaper advertisements, the SEC's
reasoning might equally have been applied to persons who had merely
read the advertisements.
If effective restrictions are not placed on the definition of "prospective clients," any attempt to narrow the scope of the plaintiff class
will be frustrated. Without restrictions, persons could maintain that
they were "prospective clients" by merely reciting ·that they had
intended to become clients of the adviser at some future date.. It
would be more in accordance with the legislative history of the
Adviser's Act, and with the Supreme Court's rationale in Blue Chip
Stamps, for courts to use the "prospective client" language to refer
only to the time at which the section 206 violation occurred, not to
plaintiffs status when the suit is brought. Under this interpretation,
only clients could bring section 206 actions but they could recover for
injury suffered as a result of adviser malfeasance that occurred while
they were prospective clients. For example, if an adviser makes
154. The advisory contract need not be denominated as such. In Bolger v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the
"investment advisers" were the general partners of a limited partnership, and the
"clients" of those advisers were the limited partners. In this situation, the partnership
agreement would function as an "advisory contract" for the purposes of determining
who the adviser's clients are.
155. If there is no fee paid for advisory services, there is good reason to conclude
that the profferor of those services is not an "investment adviser'' within the meaning
of section 206 and hence should not be amenable to suit under that section. For a
discussion of the class of possible defendants in section 206 private actions, see text at
notes 166-85 infra.
156. 38 S.E.C. 256 (1958). In revoking the adviser's registration in this case for
fraudulent and deceptive solicition of clients, the Commission stated that it was
"immaterial" that the adviser had no clients at the time the misconduct took place.
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material misstatements to a nonclient about the value of certain
securities and if that nonclient subsequently becomes a client and
suffers losses as a result of investing in (or failing to invest in) those
securities, the client should be able to recover notwithstanding that
the violations of section 206 occurred prior to establishment of the
adviser/ client relationship. In cases involving section 206 violations
that occurred when the plaintiff was a "prospective client," courts
should strictly enforce materiality and causation requirements: If
these requirements are not adhered to, then an adviser who, for
example, violates the advertising rule157 by including a former client's
testimonial will be subject to damage liability to all persons who read
the advertisement, became clients, and subsequently suffered losses
due to the adviser's advice. Such expanded liability would certainly
have a deleterious effect on the advisory industry, a result inconsistent
with legislative intent.
Regardless of the scope of the plaintiff class in section 206
actions, it is necessary to determine the propriety of imposing additional requirements for bringing the action, akin to the "purchaser/
seller" requirement for suits under rule lOb-5. Although there is no
language in section 206 explicitly imposing such a limitation, a court
could read these restrictions into section 206 by relying upon the
reference to "investors" found in the legislative history of the Advisers Act. 158
The "purchase or sale" of securities requirement in 10b-5 actions,
first articulated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp. 159 and recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps, has been viewed as effectuating a congressional intent to
preclude federal courts from "inquir[ing] into every decision affecting the management of corporations and then fashion[ing] a new
federal law superseding state law on the fiduciary responsibilities of
corporate directors, officers, and controlling persons." 160 According
to Professor Bromberg, "The requirement also serves a causation
purpose, to assure that plaintiff has a real, rather than hypothetical
injury." 161 Recovery in the section 206 context could be limited to
losses from buying or selling securities as a result of adviser malfeasance, thereby facilitating damage computation, reducing the prospect
that courts would have before them only plaintiff's uncorroborated
oral evidence, minimizing plaintiff recovery for conjectural injuries,
and reducing the possibility of "strike" suits. .
A requirement of this type would disallow recovery by a client
151.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See text at notes 108-09 supra.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21.
193 F.2d 641, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809 (5th Cir. 1970).
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 4.7(567) at 88.9-.10.
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who had purchased securities prior to consulting the adviser and had
retained those securities to his detriment on the basis of the adviser's
deceptive or fraudulent representations. Recovery would similarly be
denied to a client who decided not to buy a certain security on the
basis of adviser malfeasance. The injury of the client in such instances, however, flows from a breach of the adviser/ client fiduciary
relationship and logically should be redressed to protect that relationship adequately. It would seem appropriate, then, in light of the
purpose of the Act, to allow recovery if competing interests can
reasonably be accommodated.
One method of according these interests sufficient weight while
allowing recovery where it is needed most is to impose the proposed
client/potential-client limitation and a proof of causation requirement
(discussed below1112). If these two restrictions on recovery are applied, damage calculations will in most instances not be difficult:
Courts can allow damages that will put the client in the position he
would have been in had he not followed the adviser's recommendation. Moreover, courts will not be forced to decide delicate factual
questions on the basis of plaintiffs uncorroborated oral evidence since
advisers will have knowledge of the advice rendered, of ,the date it
was rendered, of the strength of the advice, and, in many circumstances, of plaintiffs disposition to follow such advice. To be sure,
difficult problems arise in determining whether the adviser's statements actually injured the client. But courts will have considerably
more information on which to base the decision than in the rule 10b5 context considered in Blue Chip Stamps. This information available to determine the legitimacy of plaintiffs allegations of injury will
also reduce the possibility of plaintiff recovery for conjectural injuries
and the feasibility of "strike suits." Neither, of course, will be
entirely eliminated, but the possibility of both exists in many types of
litigation and should not in this context be considered overriding.
Imposition of client/potential-client and causation requirements
should sufficiently reduce the possibility of either to allow courts to
imply a section 206 cause of action without imposing a "purchase or
sale" type of requirement.
Finally, support for the implication of a section 206 cause of
action without the imposition of a purchaser/ seller requirement can
be found in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath. 163
There the court granted a motion to dismiss the rule l0b-5 claim
because the "sale" did not occur "in connection with" the fraudulent
conduct, 164 but it did not dismiss the companion section 206 claim.
The court discussed the purchaser/seller requirement only in the
162. See text at notes 186-92 infra.
163. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
164. 381 F. Supp. at 267.
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context of the l0b-5 claim;165 it apparently did not think the requirement was applicable to section 206.

C.

The Defendant Class

Section 206 of the Advisers Act regulates the activities of "investment advisers" rather than, like rule l0b-5, the activities of any
person. The section applies to all "investment advisers" as defined in
section 202(a)(l l), 166 including those who are exempt from registration with the SEC under section 203(b). 167
Section 202(a)(l 1) provides:
"Investment Adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities . . . or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not include (A)
a bank, or any bank holding company . . . which is not an investment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice
of his profession; (C) any broker or dealer whose performance of
such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a
broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor;
(D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or
business or financial publication of general and regular circulation;
(E) any person whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than securities which are direct obligations of or obligations
guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States . . . ; or
(F) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as
the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order. 168
While detailed, this definition is subject to conflicting interpretations.
It is therefore appropriate to consider whether the principal purpose
of section 206 justifies a broad construction. The exceptions listed in
section 202(a)(l 1) basically exclude persons who give investment
advice incidentally in the course of rendering other professional services. Section 202(a)(l 1) literally seems to encompass, therefore, all
persons or entities on whom it is justifiable to impose fiduciary
obligations with respect to the dispensing of investment advice. 100 A
165. 381 F. Supp. at 265-67.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1970).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1970). This section exempts from registration ad-

visers who do only "local" business and who do not deal in securities listed on national exchanges, advisers whose only clients are insurance companies, and advisers
who have had fewer than 15 clients over the course of the past year and who neither
hold themselves out as advisers to the general public, nor act as advisers to investment companies.
168. The author's research unearthed no decisions in which an alleged violator
has challenged the SEC's enforcement of section 206 by claiming that he is not an
"investment adviser."
169. "Section 202(a)(l 1) of the [Investment Advisers] Act lists a number of
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broader construction could expose to liability advisers not fairly engaged in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, and/ or those not
engaged in rendering investment advice who aid or abet or otherwise
participate with a bona fide adviser in a violation of section 206.
Section 202(a)(ll) gives the SEC the power to determine who
falls within the "intent" of that provision, a power used in numerous
advisory letters over the years attempting to explicate which persons
or entities fall within the definition of "investment adviser." 170 The
SEC decisions suggest that, in general, if the services being offered
"can be used to determine the value of securities and the advisability
of investing in, purchasing or selling securities,"171 and are being
offered for a fee to the general public, then the person rendering those
services is an "investment adviser" within the intent of the Advisers
Act regardless whether the services contain a value judgment with
regard to the analyzed securities. 172 On the other hand, where the
advice is given exclusively to members of the adviser's family or to
close personal friends, even if a fee is charged, the adviser is not an
"investment adviser" within the intent of section 202.173
Thus, in delineating the class of "investment advisers," the SEC
has focused on the business aspects of the adviser's services and
attempted to separate those advisers who, by representing themselves
examples of persons or entities whose activities might fall within the broad definition
of 'investment adviser' but whose customary practices would not place them in the
special, otherwise unregulated, fiduciary role for which the law established standards."
SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 958 (1970). See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1396-401; Loomis, supra
note 7, at 246 ("Since there are a multitude of persons who have and express ideas or
factual data about the stock market and many hope to derive some return from suQb.
expressions, the scope of the basic definition turns largely upon the phrases 'engaging
in the business' or 'as part of a regular business.'" (footnotes omitted)).
170. The Commission has advised that the following are all "investment advisers": a corporation offering a computer analysis of investment performance· to brokerdealers, Investment Decisions, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 78,330 (June 23, 1971); a corporation that
intended to publish a newsletter evaluating the performance of certain investment
advisers, Schield Stock Serv., Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1[ 78,649 (Jan. 26, 1972); and a company that, for a $10 fee,
would "trace the history of a company that has become somewhat obscure through
conversion of its stock, merger, liquidation, or some other reason, for the purpose of
determining whether the stock of that company has any value.'' Securities Research
Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r
78,790 (April 7, 1972).
171. Investment Decisions, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 78,330 (June 23, 1971).
172. See, e.g., Securities Research Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1[ 78,790 (April 7, 1972).
173. See, e.g., Roosevelt & Son, 29 S.E.C. 879 (1949); Pitcairn Co., 29 S.E.C.
186 (1949). See also Loran K. Lantz, SEC no-action letter, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 78,912 (May 11, 1972) (author of one book on
how to invest in securities would not be in "business" of giving investment advice
unless book contained formulae for making investment decisions so as to make it
likely that 1he book would be sold "continuously and indefinitely").
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to the public as experts, have incurred fiduciary obligations to their
clients, from those advisers who, by functioning in a purely personal
setting, have not. In so doing, the SEC seems accurately to have
assessed and implemented congressional intent. In so far as the purpose of section 206 is simply to preserve the fiduciary relationship
where it exists, there is little reason for courts to dispute the SEC's
presumptively valid interpretation of "investment adviser" and broaden or restrict the definition to any significant degree. 174
The propriety of exposing to section 206 liability those who aid or
abet or otherwise figure in a violation of that section arose in both
decisions discussing the implication of a section 206 cause of action.
Accountant-defendants in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath allegedly "aided and abetted" a section 206 violation by
accepting money from the "investment advisers" (general partners)
of a limited partnership in return for falsifying the partnership's
financial statements. The court rejected the accountants' contentions
that section 206 should be read literally:
[T]he fraudulent activities of the acountant-defendants in this suit
were inexorably intertwined with the fraud being perpetrated against
the limited partners by [the partnership's] investment advisors. To
deny to these investors, who were injured by this combined fraudulent
conduct, a cause of action against all of the wrongdoers would leave
the plaintiffs with half a remedy and would run afoul of the Supreme
Court's repeated admonition that the securities laws are to be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
[their] broad remedial purposes". 175
174. In the one case in which the issue whether the defendant was an investment
adviser was raised, the court rejected the SEC's interpretation. In Selzer v. Bank of
Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the plaintiff, the beneficiary of a
trust established to invest in American securities, brought suit against the defendant
bank trustee under, inter alia, sections 206, 214, and 215 of the Advisers Act. 385 F.
Supp. at 417. The court noted that the SEC had recently ruled that a trustee of an
investment trust was an adviser within the meaning of the Act, 385 F. Supp. at 420,
but went on to state:
A trustee is historically the legal owner of the trust corpus, while the beneficiary is the equitable owner. The trustee does not advise the trust corpus, which
then takes action pursuant to his advice; rather the trustee acts himself as principal. While there may be public policy reasons for holding a trustee who deals
in securities for its trust to the standards of the Investment Advisers Act, neither
the common sense meaning of the word "adviser" nor a comparison with other
situations to which the 1940 Act has been held applicable militates in favor of
doing so. The Court therefore finds that the Investment Advisers Act is not
available in a suit against a trustee in these circumstances.
385 F. Supp. at 420.
What the court in Selzer failed to recognize is that the term "investment adviser"
should be interpreted not only in the light of common sense, but also in accordance
with legislative intent. To the extent that a bank solicits business as a trustee by
holding itself out to the public as competent to make investment decisions it would
seem squarely to fall within the intent of the definition of investment adviser in the
Act.
175. 381 F. Supp. at 268, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.
375 U.S. 180, 195 (1964).
'
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The court in Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, 176 however, reached the
opposite conclusion on the ground that, since section 206 "applies
only to 'investment advisers,' only such persons should be amenable
to suit."177
The Bolger court apparently relied at least in part on the amenability to liability of aiders and abettors and co-conspirators under rule
lOb-5. 178 Section 206 and rule lOb-5 are distinguishable, however.
While "[t]he phrasing of l0b-5, particularly 'any person,' 'scheme
. . . to defraud' and 'course of business which operates . . . as a
fraud,' invites inspection of broad spectra of conduct and of all the
actors in them,'' 179 section 206 appears to limit the inspection of
actors in fraudulent schemes to those within the definition of investment adviser.
Despite the language differences between these provisions, there
are valid reasons why courts should expose secondary culpable actors
to section 206 liability. First, a refusal to allow suit under section
206 against aiders and abettors or co-conspirators of investment
advisers would often create incongruous results. For example, suppose an investment adviser and a broker-dealer enter into an arrangement whereby the adviser agrees to direct all of his clients' portfolios
to the dealer in return for credit against equipment expenses-a
"prima facie" violation of section 206 according to the SEC. 180 Under
this arrangement, the adviser would profit to the extent of the credit
received and the broker-dealer would profit to the extent of the
brokerage fees generated by the accounts referred. 181 If the adviser's
clients are injured by this arrangement, by receiving inadequate or
biased execution of their accounts, it seems inappropriate to insulate
from liability the broker-dealer who has profited by the violation
often more than the adviser. Second, in many situations the culpable
nonadviser may be the only economically viable source from which
the plaintiff can recover. 182 Third, the nonadviser in many situations
will be a professional-e.g., accountant, lawyer, or broker-dealer176. Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974).
177. Order of Dismissal at 3.
178. See 381 F. Supp. at 268. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 645 (1972).
179. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.5(515), at 208.4.
180. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC no-action letter, [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1[ 78,120 (March 27, 1973).
181. The broker-dealer may profit in other, more subtle, ways by this arrangement. The adviser's clients may recommend the broker-dealer to other persons, or
may continue using the broker-dealer's services once their relationship with the
adviser has been terminated.
182. This was apparently true in Bolger where plaintiffs, limited partners of a
since-dissolved limited partnership, sought to recover from the accountants that had
prepared the partnership's financial statements, rather than from the investment
advisers (general partners) themselves.
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who, in his own right, owes a duty of "fair dealing" to the public. 183
Finally, it would be unreasonable to deny recovery under section 206
from aiders and abettors or co-conspirators when such recovery is
available under rule 1Ob-5 in situations where there is an actual
purchase or sale of securities in connection with adviser misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Denying recovery from nonadvisers under
section 206 while permitting it under rule 10b-5 would mean, for
example, that plaintiffs could recover under rule 10b-5 from nonadvisers in a case like Bolger if the partnership is dissolved "in connection with" the adviser's fraudulent activities, 184 but could not recover
under section 206 if the partnership is dissolved (as it was in Bolger)
after the commission of the fraudulent activities. Certainly, the
culpability of the ncinadvisers is no greater in the former case than in
the latter.
If courts do include secondary culpable parties· in the class of
persons amenable to suit under section 206, they should insist on a
showing that these secondary parties had knowledge of the illegal
actions of the investment adviser. Without such a showing, fiduciary
obligations of these parties would equal or exceed the obligations
imposed on advisers themselves under section 206. As has been said
with regard to the liability of aiders and abettors and co-conspirators
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts: "Deviation from [the knowledge]
requirement would unreasonably impose liability on secondary defendants. Adherence to [this] requirement still allows imposition of
liability in appropriate cases, since knowledge can be shown by
reckless conduct or through inference." 185

D.

Causation and Reliance

The interplay of several concepts underlies the issue whether an
adviser's malfeasance caused the client's alleged injury. When the
malfeasance involves misrepresentation or nondisclosure, causation is
best thought of in terms of client reliance and the materiality of the
information misrepresented or not disclosed. When the malfeasance
is of some other sort, causation becomes more complex and more
weighty policy factors militate against the imposition of any absolute
causation requirement.
In establishing a causation requirement for adviser misrepresentation or nondisclosure, effective analogy can be made to the rule 10b-5
183. For a discussion of how tort-law theories of liability for breach of a
professional defendant's obligations to the public might affect his secondary liability
under rule l0b-5, see Ruder, supra note 178, at 612-18.
184. This might have occurred if, for example, the general partners/advisers had
attempted to make the financial situation of the partnership look worse than it really
was in an effort to have the partnership dissolved in order to take over its accounts
later on.
185. Ruder, supra note 178, at 638.
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context. There courts have eschewed requiring plaintiffs to show
affirmatively that they relied on the informational error. 186 The
difficulty in proving or disproving reliance, as Professor Bromberg
has noted, "is likely to produce only a ritual of pleading followed by 'I
relied' testimony from the plaintiff." 187 Instead, courts have focused
on the issue of materiality-whether information that a reasonable
investor might have considered important in making investmentrelated decisions has been misrepresented or withheld. 188 Because of
the "potential massive liability to hordes of investors who are in fact
trading on a variety of data, appraisals, and intuitions," 189 a strict
materiality requirement has been necessary to limit liability. 190
With slight alteration, this approach seems appropriate to apply to
section 206 actions alleging nondisclosure or misrepresentation. By
limiting the plaintiff class to clients and the defendant class to bona
fide advisers, section 206 actions would be restricted to situations
where reliance by the plaintiff is both reasonable and expected.
Indeed, it is fair to assume that when a client acts in accordance with
an adviser's opinion, he does so in reliance upon that opinion. Courts
thus could presume reliance in all instances of material misrepresentation and nondisclosure. 191 In light of the congressional desire to
186. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972).
.
187. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.6(2), at 210.
188. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
189. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.3, at 199.
190. Id.
191. In Competitive Capital Corp. v. Yamada, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,617 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974), a private damage action
brought by a mutual fund and the fund's manager against, inter alia, the same
accountant-defendants as in the Bolger case and alleging violations of section 17a of
the 1933 act, section lO(b) of the 1934 act, and section 206 of the Advisers Act for
the same conduct alleged to be violative of section 206 in Bolger (i.e. the certification
of false financial statements of Takara, Ltd.), the court granted the accountantdefendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs failed to show that they had relied
on the statements prepared by defendants.
Plaintiffs in Competititive Capital alleged that they had been induced to hire
defendant Yamada, general partner and "investment adviser" of Takara, Ltd., as a
fund manager on the basis of information provided by Yamada to plaintiffs describing
the "success" of the Takara operation. The accountant-defendants, by preparing
Takara's false financial statements, were alleged to have been involved in the fraud
that induced plaintiffs' deci~ion. The court found that plaintiffs could not have relied
on the accountant-defendants' activities, as ,there was evidence that plaintiffs did not
see Takara's financial statements until four days before they fired Yamada. The
problem with the court's reasoning in Competitive Capital is that it makes the
accountant-defendants' liability turn solely on whether plaintiffs relied on a financial
statement prepared for a totally different purpose. The court should have focused on
whether the accountant-defendants knew of Yamada's fraudulent scheme to convince
the Fund to hire him. If knowledge of, and participation in, the scheme to defraud
the Fund was present, then plaintiffs, who could justifiably be presumed to have relied
on their relationship with their investment adviser, should have been able to recover
whether or not they had relied on the statements certified by the accountants.
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avoid overregulation of the advisory industry, however, it seems
reasonable to afford defendants an opportunity to prove that reliance
did not in fact occur or should not reasonably have occurred. The
requirement of materiality could be applied in a manner similar to the
rule 10b-5 context, tempered, perhaps, by taking into account subjective factors such as the particular plaintiffs sophistication in the
securities market. 192 This tempering seems appropriate, first, because the amount of disclosure that satisfies an adviser's fiduciary
duties should to some degree tum on the client's sophistication, and,
second, because minor misrepresentations might mislead an unsophisticated client when a more knowledgeable one should not reasonably
be.misled.
The causation requirement in the context of section 206 violations
not involving nondisclosure or misrepresentations should be applied
both to compensate clients for injuries actually suffered and to preclude defendants from being enriched by their violations. In many
instances of unlawful adviser/ client or adviser/broker-dealer arrangements, clients will be unable to prove that any specific loss or any
missed opportunity for gain resulted from the section 206 violations.
In such instances, courts should allow plaintiffs to recover restitutionary damages in the amount of the defendants' enrichment. Where
advisers receive unlawful payments or credits from broker-dealers, for
example, clients should have the opportunity to recover the value of
those payments or credits in lieu of recovering actual damages. One
problem raised by this approach. is that of allocating these payments
or credits among the adviser's clients. In other areas, however, such
as the area of copyright or patent infringement, courts have not
hesitated to make a rough allocation in determining the amount of
profits attributable to the infringement and have resolved all reasonable doubts in favor of the plaintiff. 183 A similar approach toward
allocation seems appropriate in this context.
When plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable causal connection
between the section 206 violation and actual losses, 184 recovery
should, of course, be allowed. Recovery of actual damages in absence of causation, however, seems inappropriate. In Courtland v.
192. If courts do indeed limit the class of plaintiffs who can sue under section 206
to clients and limit defendants to "investment advisers," there would be no reason not
to take these subjective factors into account in determining the materiality of
defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure. This would be more equitable than,
for instance, using the SEC's "unsophisticated investor" test to determine liability in
all instances.
193. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 402-03
(1939).
194. In Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court,
analogizing to the rule lOb-5 context, dismissed the plaintiffs' section 206 claim
because plaintiffs suffered no out-of-pocket losses as a result of defendants' fraudulent
acts. The issue whether "actual losses" should be restricted to out-of-pocket losses in
section 206 actions is beyond the scope of this Note.
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Walston & Co., 105 the district court apparently abandoned the causation requirement and relied instead on the Second Circuit's opinion
in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German196 to permit a plaintiff who was in
pari delicto to recoup her losses from a defendant who had engaged
in a fraudulent scheme violative of both rule 10b-5 and section
206. 107 What the Courtland court overlooked, however, was the fact
that, although plaintiff in Pearlstein had been in pari delicto, his losses
clearly had resulted from the allegedly fraudulent conduct. Allowance of recovery without a causal connection seems unnecessary in
light of the availability of both restitutionary recovery and SEC
sanctions. Moreover, in the absence of a causation requirement,
advisers could be subjected to liability grossly disproportionate to the
wrong; qualified individuals might thus be deterred from entering the
advisory field-a result Congress wanted to avoid.

E .. Scienter
Establishing a scienter requirement doubtless will be one of the
most difficult tasks for courts constructing a section 206 cause of
action. As Professor Bromberg has stated: "One of the most troublesome aspects of fraud litigation is the requisite state of mind of the
parties. The complexities relate primarily to the defendant and focus
initially on what scienter or state of mind (in terms of intent, purpose,
knowledge or belief) is necessary to frame a cause of action against
him." 108 When conduct not involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure is at issue, courts may find the imposition of strict liability
often appropriate. Most such violations turn on unlawful adviser/
broker-dealer or adviser/ client arrangements, or unlawful fee arrangements. Unless advisers are allowed the unusual defense of
ignorance of the law, it should suffice to show that the adviser knew.
of the arrangement.
195. 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
196. 429 F.2d 1136 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
197. The alleged violation involved a scheme whereby the adviser would "tip" his
individual clients as to stock later recommended to subscribers in a newsletter
published by the adviser. The court emphatically upheld plaintiffs right to recover
under both section 206 and section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act:
I find that defendants were making recommendations to customers of stocks
prior to the appearance thereof in the weekly market letter, and were offering to
give plaintiff, and presumably others, the benefit of advance notice of what
would appear in the market letter. This, without more, is a fraudulent and deceptive device in connection with the sale of securities. It had as its purpose,
effective in the case of plaintiff, to induce the sale of securities which she owned,
through defendants, and the purchase of securities recommended by defendants.
This, of course, generated a trading volume, and produced brokers, commissions
beneficial both to the registered representatives advising plaintiff and to [plaintiffs broker]. Use of this device, without more, gives rise to liability, although
it is satisfactorily established that the securities recommended were considered
"good" recommendations, and that the sales recommendations made are justified ••.•
198. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.4(000), at 203.
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More difficulties arise in establishing scienter for misrepresentation and nondisclosure since advisers cannot be required to know
everything about the corporations whose securities they recommend.
The scienter requirement for actions under rule lOb-5, to which
analogy again is appropriate, remains unclear. 100 Although courts
have generally agreed that plaintiff need prove something less than
common-law fraud to state a claim under rule l0b-5, 200 there has
been little agreement as to what that "something less" must be. The
Second and Ninth Circuits, in particular, have traditionally taken
opposite positions on whether proof of defendant's negligence alone is
enough to sustain a rule 10b-5 claim;201 the Ninth Circuit has
generally found negligence sufficient202 while the Second Circuit has
not. 203 In recent years, however, both circuits have moved away
from the approach of framing the issue in terms of "scienter" and
have begun to focus instead on whether the defendant owed a duty of
disclosure to plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and whether
that duty was breached. 204 The Second Circuit has formulated a
fairly strict standard of "duty" under rule 10b-5: "The standard
for determining liability under Rule l 0b-5 essentially is whether
plaintiff has established that defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated or omitted and should have realized
their significance, or failed or refused to ascertain and disclose
such facts when they were readily available to him and he had
reasonable grounds to believe that they existed." 205 The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, has chosen to remain more flexible
in light of the "varied factual contexts" in which rule 10b-5
claims arise206 and has articulated various considerations for determining a particular defendant's duty of disclosure under that rule:
Without limiting the trial court from making additions or adaptations
in a particular case, we feel the court should, in instructing on a defendant's duty under rule l0b-5, require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to
199. See generally id. §§ 8.4(500)-(690).
200. Id. § 8.4(501 ), at 204.101.
201. For a general comparison of Second and Ninth Circuit opinions regarding
scienter in rule lOb-5 actions, see Note, Scienter and Rule I0b-5: Development of a
New Standard • .• , 23 Cl.EV. ST. L. REV. 493, 500-11 (1974).
202. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
203. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.
1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
204. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1974); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane); Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973).
205. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973).
206. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 732-35 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that
the defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in
making his investment decisions and the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question. 207

Section 206 private actions involving misrepresentation and nondisclosure provide an appropriate context in which to apply this
"duty/breach" approach to scienter problems. As phrased by the
Supreme Court in Capital Gains, an adviser has toward his client "an
affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of
all material facts.' " 208 In light of the fiduciary nature of this relationship, courts facing allegations of nondisclosure should require
more of advisers than that they ascertain and disclose material facts
that are "readily available," as the Second Circuit has done in the rule
10b-5 context. Because advisers are paid to unearth facts material to
the investment decision, a standard of reasonable diligence seems
more appropriate.
In dealing with allegations of misrepresentation or nondisclosure, 200 courts must decide whether to allow recovery for mere negligence or whether a "reckless disregard" standard would be more
justified. The kind of self-policing that would be promoted by
allowing recovery for negligent conduct is certainly a desirable goal.
On the other hand, while the Supreme Court in Capital Gains found
"that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice
which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to
require proof of intent to injure [under section 206]," 210 it is suggested by the history surrounding the passage of the Advisers Act that the
kinds of conduct Congress sought to eliminate involved "knowing"
participation by investment advisers. 211 The exact standard courts
employ is less important than a judicial appreciation of the fact that
advisers are constantly called upon to render opinions on a wide
variety of investments. Clients investing large amounts of money and
paying for researched, reasoned determinations should reasonably
expect a more thorough opinion than should a client investing small
sums who asks his adviser for an immediate opinion on the worth of a
particular security. Using prevailing industry practices as a guide and
factoring in the materiality of the misinformation, courts should
fashion a test that encourages responsible practices without requiring
207. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
208. 375 U.S. at 194.
209. Standards of "negligence" or "reckless disregard" will rarely be illuminating
in the context of noninformational violations of section 206. To label as "negligent"
the adviser who enters into an agreement that is a prima facie violation of section 206
is to understate the culpability of the adviser vis-a-vis the client.
210. 375 U.S. at 195.
211. See note 6 supra and accompanying text; note 62 supra.
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advisers to research each recommendation so thoroughly that they
must charge fees beyond the means of the average individual investor.
ill.

CONCLUSION

The similarities between section 206 and rule 10b-5 and the need
for private enforcement of section 206 to supplement SEC efforts
strongly recommend the judicial implication of a cause of action
under that provision. While a section 206 action would overlap
substantially with the private action under rule l0b-5, an implied
private cause of action could be of significant aid, first, because of the
lack of "in connection with" and "purchase or sale" requirements,
second, because recovery for fraudulent activities not involving misrepresentation and nondisclosure would be allowed, and, finally, because restitutionary recovery would be possible without a demonstration of causation.

